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The Real McCoy: Defining the Defendant’s Right to
Autonomy in the Wake of McCoy v. Louisiana
Colin Miller*
Defense counsel, and not the defendant, has the power to make most
decisions in a criminal case. Until recently, there were only four
decisions reserved for the defendant: whether to (1) plead guilty, (2)
waive the right to a jury trial, (3) testify, and (4) forgo an appeal. In
McCoy v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court recently added a
fifth decision reserved for the client: the right to autonomy, i.e., the right
to decide on the objective of her defense. Under this right, a defendant
can prevent her attorney from admitting her legal guilt at trial by
preemptively objecting to this course of conduct. But what if the
defendant didn’t (and couldn’t) object because defense counsel never ran
the decision to admit guilt by her client? And what if, without the
defendant’s consent, defense counsel admitted that her client committed
an element of the crime but not all of the elements (e.g., actus reus but
not mens rea)? Would McCoy be inapposite because the client did not
object and/or her attorney did not admit full legal guilt? Courts have split
on both issues, leading to the question of what constitutes the real
McCoy. This Article argues that the right to autonomy is broad and
precludes a defense attorney from admitting any opprobrious element of
the crime(s) charged without first disclosing that decision to his client.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In McCoy v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court observed that
while a criminal defense attorney mainly calls the shots, at least four
decisions are reserved for the defendant: whether to (1) plead guilty, (2)
waive the right to a jury trial, (3) testify, and (4) forgo an appeal.1 The
McCoy Court then added a fifth decision reserved for the client: the right
to autonomy, i.e., the right “to decide on the objective of his defense.”2
Pursuant to this right, a defendant decides whether “to admit guilt in the
hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his
innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”3 Therefore, as in the McCoy case, defense counsel could not
argue to the jury, over the defendant’s objection, that his client was guilty
of three murders in the hope that the jurors would spare his life.4
But what if the defendant didn’t (and couldn’t) object because defense
counsel never ran the decision to admit guilt by his client? And what if,
without the defendant’s consent, defense counsel admitted that his client
committed an element of the crime but not all of the elements (e.g., actus
reus but not mens rea)? Would McCoy be inapposite because the client
did not object and/or his attorney did not admit full legal guilt? Courts
have split on both issues, leading to the question of what constitutes the
real McCoy.
This Article argues that the right to autonomy is broad and precludes a
defense attorney from admitting any opprobrious element of the crime(s)
charged without first disclosing that decision to his client. In Section II,
the Article explores the rules and precedent surrounding the requirement
that a defendant must knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently make the
decision to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify, and forgo
an appeal. In Section III, the Article then contends that a similar
requirement must apply to the right to autonomy, meaning that a
defendant’s right to autonomy is violated when his attorney does not fully
inform him of the decision to admit guilt. The Article argues that the right
to autonomy recognized in McCoy includes not only the right to avoid the
legal consequences of admitting legal guilt but also the “opprobrium that
comes with admitting” criminal behavior.5
II. DECISIONS LEFT TO THE DEFENDANT
In recognizing that a defendant retains the right “to decide on the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018).
Id. at 1505.
Id.
Id. at 1506–07.
Id. at 1508.
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objective of his defense,” the McCoy Court noted that at least four other
decisions are reserved for the defendant: whether to (1) plead guilty, (2)
waive the right to a jury trial, (3) testify, and (4) forgo an appeal. This
section explores the rules and precedent surrounding each of these
decisions to provide context for a subsequent discussion of the scope of
the right to autonomy.
A. The Decision About How to Plead
1. Brookhart v. Janis and the Defendant’s Decision About How to
Plead
The Supreme Court’s 1966 opinion in Brookhart v. Janis6 rested
authority in the defendant to decide whether to waive his right to plead
not guilty. In Brookhart, James Brookhart initially pleaded not guilty at
his arraignment on charges of forgery and uttering false instruments.7
Brookhart was subsequently appointed counsel, who “told the judge that
his client had signed waivers of trial by jury and wanted to be tried by the
court.”8 The judge then confirmed with Brookhart that he had signed “two
written waivers of trial by jury” and engaged in a colloquy with defense
counsel.9
During that colloquy, defense counsel said that the matter was before
the court on a prima facie case, i.e., that “he would not contest the state’s
case or cross-examine its witnesses but would require only that the state
prove each of the essential elements of the crime.”10 The judge responded
by saying, “Ordinarily in a prima facie case . . . the defendant, not
technically or legally, in effect admits his guilt and wants the State to
prove it.” Brookhart then interjected, “I would like to point out in no way
am I pleading guilty to this charge.”11
After he was subsequently convicted, Brookhart appealed, claiming
that he was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against
him.12 In response, the Supreme Court of Ohio appointed Master
Commissioners, who concluded that “petitioner although he did not plead
guilty agreed that all the state had to prove was a prima facie case, that
he would not contest it and that there would be no cross-examination of
witnesses.”13 The Supreme Court of Ohio later adopted this conclusion.14
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1966).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3 (quoting Brookhart v. Haskins, 205 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ohio 1965)).
Id. at 6 (quoting from the trial court record).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3 (quoting Brookhart, 205 N.E.2d at 912–13).
Id. at 3 (citing Brookhart, 205 N.E.2d at 914).
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The United States Supreme Court disagreed.15 It first found that it was
Brookhart’s attorney who “agree[d] to this truncated kind of trial—if trial
it could be called.”16 Further, it decided “that petitioner himself did not
intelligently and knowingly agree to be tried in a proceeding which was
the equivalent of a guilty plea and in which he would not have the right
to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses against him.”17
This left the Court with the question of “whether counsel has power to
enter a plea which is inconsistent with his client’s expressed desire and
thereby waive his client’s constitutional right to plead not guilty and have
a trial in which he can confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him.”18 The Court answered this question in the negative, concluding
“that the constitutional rights of a defendant cannot be waived by his
counsel under such circumstances.”19 Finally, the Court held that nothing
in its prior opinion in Henry v. State of Mississippi could “possibly
support a contention that counsel for defendant can override his client’s
desire expressed in open court to plead not guilty and enter in the name
of his client another plea—whatever the label.”20
2. Taylor v. Illinois and the Respective Roles of the Defendant and
Defense Counsel
While Brookhart did not deal with a literal guilty plea, the Supreme
Court in Taylor v. Illinois later made clear that Brookhart’s holding did
cover such pleas and clarified the respective roles of the defendant and
defense counsel. In Taylor v. Illinois, Ray Taylor was charged with
attempted murder in connection with a street fight on the South Side of
Chicago.21 On day two of trial, Taylor’s attorney filed an oral motion to
amend his Answer to Discovery to include two witnesses, including
Alfred Wormley, saying “that he had just been informed about them and
that they had probably seen the ‘entire incident.’”22 Although this was a
discovery violation, the judge allowed “an offer of proof in the form of
Wormley’s testimony outside the presence of the jury.”23 Wormley then
testified that he “had not been a witness to the incident itself” but instead
saw the victims before the street fight carrying “two guns in a blanket,”
15. Id. at 7–8 (explaining that the constitutional rights of a defendant cannot be waived by their
counsel under the circumstances present in Brookhart, despite Henry v. Mississippi allowing it
under certain circumstances).
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7–8 (citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965)).
21. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 402 (1988).
22. Id. at 403 (quoting from the trial court record).
23. Id. at 404.
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saying “they were after Ray [petitioner] and the other people.”24 Wormley
also claimed that he later “‘happened to run into Ray and them’ and
warned them ‘to watch out because they got weapons;’” however, he
admitted on cross-examination that “he had first met defendant ‘about
four months ago’ (i.e., over two years after the incident).”25 After hearing
Wormley’s testimony, “the trial judge concluded that the appropriate
sanction for the discovery violation was to exclude his testimony.”26
After he was convicted, Taylor appealed, claiming, inter alia, that it
was “unfair to visit the sins of the lawyer upon his client.”27 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, recognizing that it “strikes at the heart of
the attorney-client relationship.”28 According to the Court, “[a]lthough
there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully
informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer
has—and must have—full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.”29
As one of two examples of a basic right that requires a client’s consent,
the Court cited Brookhart v. Janis for the proposition that a “defendant’s
constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a trial where he could
confront and cross-examine adversary witness could not be waived by his
counsel without [the] defendant’s consent.”30 But the Court cautioned
that “[t]he adversary process could not function effectively if every
tactical decision required client approval.”31 The Court found that tactical
reasons related to disclosure of the identity of defense witnesses were no
exception, concluding that “[w]henever a lawyer makes use of the sword
provided by the Compulsory Process Clause, there is some risk that he
may wound his own client.”32
3. Boykin v. Alabama and the Procedures for Accepting a Guilty Plea
While both Brookhart and Taylor recognized the right of a defendant
to decide whether to plead guilty, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Boykin
v. Alabama set forth the procedure for determining whether that right has
been respected. In Boykin v. Alabama, Edward Boykin, Jr. pleaded guilty
to five counts of robbery and was sentenced to die.33 The Supreme Court
of Alabama unanimously rejected Boykin’s claim that the death penalty

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. (quoting from the trial court record).
Id. at 404–05 (quoting from the trial court record).
Id. at 405.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 418 n.24 (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1966)).
Id. at 418.
Id.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969).
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was cruel and unusual punishment for common-law robbery.34 Four of
the seven justices, however, “discussed the constitutionality of the
process by which the trial judge had accepted petitioner’s guilty plea.” 35
The United States Supreme Court subsequently took up this thread and
found that it was constitutional error for the trial judge to accept Boykin’s
guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.36 The Court reached this conclusion because
“a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a
conviction.”37 More than that, a guilty plea results in the waiver of several
constitutional rights, including “the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination,” “the right to trial by jury,” and “the right to confront one’s
accusers.”38 According to the Court, “[w]e cannot presume a waiver of
these three important federal rights from a silent record.”39
As support for this conclusion, the Court cited to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11, “which governs the duty of the trial judge before
accepting a guilty plea.”40 Subsequently, Rule 11 was amended in 1974
to codify Boykin and require judges to ensure defendants understand both
the rights they are waiving by pleading guilty and the consequences of
guilty pleas.41 Boykin and Rule 11 thus both stand for the proposition that
“due process requires that the record contain affirmative evidence that the
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded guilty.”42
4. Conclusion
For a guilty plea to be constitutional, “the defendant’s decision to plead
guilty must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”43 Moreover, it is a
constitutional requirement that the judge inform the defendant on the
record about the constitutional rights he is waiving before accepting his
guilty plea.44

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 242.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 243.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 243 n.5.
41. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment (“The amendment
. . . codifies . . . the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, . . . which held that a defendant must be
apprised of the fact that he relinquishes certain constitutional rights by pleading guilty.”).
42. Colin Miller, Plea Agreements as Constitutional Contracts, 97 N.C. L. REV. 31, 87 (2018).
43. Davis v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (Ind. 1996) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242–44).
44. See, e.g., Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (requiring affirmative showing of informed waiver);
Moore v. State, 486 So.2d 517, 518 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (“Because the record in this cause is
totally devoid of an explanation of appellant’s constitutional rights under Boykin v. Alabama, . . .
the judgment in this cause as to the marijuana conviction is, hereby, reversed and remanded.”).
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B. The Decision About Whether to Waive Trial by Jury
1. Waiving Trial by Jury by Pleading Guilty
There are two situations in which a defendant waives his right to trial
by jury. The first is the one referenced in the prior section, where a
defendant waives his jury right by pleading guilty and proceeding to
sentencing. In this situation, the defendant’s waiver of his jury right, like
his decision to plead guilty, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,
and the judge must advise the defendant on the record. 45
2. Waiving Trial by Jury for a Bench Trial
The second situation involves a defendant waiving his right to trial by
jury so that he can have a bench trial. Patton v. United States is the key
United States Supreme Court opinion in this area. In Patton, multiple
defendants were charged with conspiring to bribe a federal prohibition
agent.46 A jury of twelve was empaneled, but mid-trial, the judge
dismissed a juror due to severe illness.47 Thereafter, “it was stipulated in
open court by the government and counsel for defendants, defendants
personally assenting thereto, that the trial should proceed with the
remaining eleven jurors.”48 The judge responded “that the defendants and
the government both were entitled to a constitutional jury of twelve, and
that the absence of one juror would result in a mistrial unless both sides
should waive all objections and agree to a trial before the remaining
eleven jurors.”49 This was followed by a colloquy in which the “counsel
for defendants stated that he had personally conferred with all counsel
and with each of the defendants individually, and it was the desire of all
to finish the trial of the case with the eleven jurors if the defendants could
waive the presence of the twelfth juror.”50
After they were convicted, the defendants appealed, claiming they had
“had no power to waive their constitutional right to a trial by a jury of
twelve persons.”51 The United States Supreme Court disagreed,
concluding that defendants in any criminal case can “waive a trial by a
constitutional jury and submit to trial by a jury of less than twelve
persons, or by the court . . . .”52 But, according to the Court, “before any
45. See supra notes 33–44 and accompanying text (illustrating how Boykin v. Alabama
established the procedure for determining whether a defendant’s right to knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently plead guilty and waive the right to a jury trial was respected).
46. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 286 (1930).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 286–87.
51. Id. at 287.
52. Id. at 312.
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waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the
sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent
consent of the defendant.”53 Courts have interpreted Patton as holding
that the Sixth Amendment requires the waiver of the right to trial by jury
“be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”54
Finally, the requirements Patton enunciated “with respect to waiver of
jury trials were incorporated into Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
23(a).”55 Rule 23(a) states:
If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless:
(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing;
(2) the government consents; and
(3) the court approves.56

Moreover, every federal circuit court, other than the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits, has recommended that district courts should go beyond a
defendant’s written waiver through “[s]ome form of waiver colloquy.”57
Most of these courts, however, have held that neither a colloquy nor a
waiver is constitutionally required; instead, both merely help document
that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, which is a
constitutional requirement.58 In turn, such waiver is voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent if the defendant “understood that the choice confronting
him was, on the one hand, to be judged by a group of people from the
community, and on the other hand, to have his guilt or innocence
determined by a judge.”59
Every federal circuit court of appeals that has addressed the issue has
found that defense counsel renders deficient performance by failing to
advise a defendant of his right to trial by jury before the defendant waives
that right.60 Those courts differ, however, over whether such failures are
53. Id.
54. United States v. Boynes, 515 F.3d 284, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Patton, 281 U.S. at
312–13); see also United States v. Carmenate, 544 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (“It is settled that
a criminal defendant may waive his constitutional right to trial by jury if the waiver is ‘knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent.’” (citing Patton, 281 U.S. at 312)).
55. Polk v. State, 567 A.2d 1290, 1294 (Del. 1989).
56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
57. United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Some form of waiver colloquy
has been endorsed by the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, as well as by our own.”).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 559 F.3d 607, 610 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[N]either a Delgado
colloquy nor a written waiver is a constitutional mandate. . . . [T]he sole constitutional requirement
is that the waiver be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The colloquy and the written waiver serve
to document these qualities, but a jury waiver may be valid despite their absence.”).
59. Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 510 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d
821, 836 (6th Cir. 2004)).
60. See, e.g., Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 851 (3d Cir. 2017)
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structural error or whether the defendant must satisfy the prejudice prong
of the ineffective assistance of counsel test from Strickland v.
Washington.61 On one side, the Eighth Circuit has held that the failure to
advise is structural error without the requirement of proving prejudice.62
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has held that the failure to advise can be
harmless error if the court finds the defendant was nonetheless aware of
this right through “his own education and experience” and would have
waived it even if properly advised.63
3. Conclusion
When a defendant waives his right to trial by jury by pleading guilty,
there is a constitutional requirement that the judge inform the defendant
on the record about the constitutional rights he is waiving before
accepting his guilty plea/waiver.64 Furthermore, a defendant’s waiver of
the right to trial by jury in exchange for a bench trial must be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent, which courts safeguard through nonconstitutionally required protections.65 Finally, an attorney has a duty to
advise his client about his right to a jury trial before he waives it, but
courts are split over whether to presume prejudice based on dereliction of
that duty.66

(“[P]revailing professional norms required and continue to require counsel in this circumstance to
verify, through a review of the record or an inquiry with the court or prior counsel, that the client
formally waived his jury trial right.”); Jells, 538 F.3d at 509 (“Jells correctly notes that his counsel
had a professional duty to inform him of the nature of his right to a jury trial and the consequences
of waiving it so that he could make an intelligent and informed waiver decision.”).
61. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984) (“An error by counsel, even if
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding
even if the error had no effect on the judgment. . . . Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s
performance must be prejudicial in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the
Constitution.”).
62. See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (“When a defendant is
deprived of his right to trial by jury, the error is structural and requires automatic reversal of the
defendant’s conviction.”).
63. Williams, 559 F.3d at 613.
64. See supra notes 33–54 and accompanying text (explaining how guilty plea must be knowing
and voluntary because it is a conviction and waives several constitutional rights, so waiver cannot
be presumed from a silent record).
65. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text (discussing how the Constitution requires
defendant’s waiver of a jury trial be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and, under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the waiver should be in writing as well).
66. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (illustrating how some courts consider the
failure to instruct a defendant about his waiver rights plain error resulting in immediate reversal,
while others hold that is the waiver’s validity depends on how well defendant understood his waiver
rights even without instruction).
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C. The Decision About Whether to Appeal
1. Roe v. Flores-Ortega and the Duty to Consult
While a defendant decides whether to appeal,67 the question of whether
an attorney has a duty to consult with the defendant before waiving the
ability to appeal was unanswered until the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Roe v. Flores-Ortega. In Flores-Ortega, Lucio Flores-Ortega was
represented by public defender Nancy Kops when he pleaded guilty to
second-degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement.68 After sentencing
Flores-Ortega to fifteen years’ incarceration, the judge said that he could
file an appeal within sixty days.69 Although Kops wrote “bring appeal
papers” in Flores-Ortega’s file, she did not file a notice of appeal within
sixty days.70 About four months after sentencing, Flores-Ortega “tried to
file a notice of appeal, which the Superior Court Clerk rejected as
untimely.”71
Flores-Ortega’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
eventually reached the United States Supreme Court.72 First, in terms of
the “deficient performance” prong of the ineffective assistance test, the
Court framed the issue as follows:
In those cases where the defendant neither instructs counsel to file an
appeal nor asks that an appeal not be taken, we believe the question
whether counsel has performed deficiently by not filing a notice of
appeal is best answered by first asking a separate, but antecedent,
question: whether counsel in fact consulted with the defendant about an
appeal.73

The Court then clarified that it used the word “‘consult’ to convey a
specific meaning—advising the defendant about the advantages and
disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to
discover the defendant’s wishes.”74 If there is such consultation, “the
question of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs
in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the
defendant’s express instructions with respect to an appeal.”75 Conversely,
“[i]f counsel has not consulted with the defendant, the court must in turn
ask a second, and subsidiary, question: whether counsel’s failure to
67. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (“Some decisions, however, are
reserved for the client—notably, whether to . . . forgo an appeal.”).
68. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 473 (2000).
69. Id. at 474.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 476.
73. Id. at 478.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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consult with the defendant itself constitutes deficient performance.”76
The Court had to decide when an attorney has a duty to consult.77
“Because the decision to appeal rests with the defendant,”78 Justice
Souter would have held that defense “counsel ‘almost always’ has a duty
to consult with a defendant about an appeal.”79 The majority, however,
disagreed:
Such a holding would be inconsistent with both our decision in
Strickland and common sense. For example, suppose that a defendant
consults with counsel; counsel advises the defendant that a guilty plea
probably will lead to a 2 year sentence; the defendant expresses
satisfaction and pleads guilty; the court sentences the defendant to 2
years’ imprisonment as expected and informs the defendant of his
appeal rights; the defendant does not express any interest in appealing,
and counsel concludes that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for
appeal. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to say that
counsel is “professionally unreasonable,” as a constitutional matter, in
not consulting with such a defendant regarding an appeal. Or, for
example, suppose a sentencing court’s instructions to a defendant about
his appeal rights in a particular case are so clear and informative as to
substitute for counsel’s duty to consult. In some cases, counsel might
then reasonably decide that he need not repeat that information. We
therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with
the defendant regarding an appeal.80

Rather than impose this bright line rule, the majority recognized a
narrower duty, finding “a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with
the defendant about an appeal,” only “when there is reason to think either
(1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because
there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular
defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in
appealing.”81
Second, regarding the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of
counsel test, the Court “held that when an attorney’s deficient
performance costs a defendant an appeal that the defendant would have
otherwise pursued, prejudice to the defendant should be presumed ‘with
no further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying
claims.’”82
That said, the Court remanded rather than granted relief because the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 480 (quoting id. at 488 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Id. at 479–80 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 480.
Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 742 (2019) (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484).
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lower courts’ factual findings did not provide “sufficient information to
determine whether Ms. Kops rendered constitutionally inadequate
assistance.”83 Instead, the findings suggested “that there may have been
some conversation between Ms. Kops and respondent about an appeal,
. . . but d[id] not indicate what was actually said.”84 Therefore,
“[a]ssuming, arguendo, that there was a duty to consult in this case, it
[was] impossible to determine whether that duty was satisfied without
knowing whether Ms. Kops advised respondent about the advantages and
disadvantages of taking an appeal and made a reasonable effort to
discover his wishes.”85
2. Garza v. Idaho and Appeal Waivers
In Garza v. Idaho, the Supreme Court found this duty to consult applies
even if the defendant has signed an appellate waiver. In Garza, Gilberto
Garza, Jr., entered into two plea agreements with appeal waivers
connected to drug and aggravated assault charges.86 Shortly after
sentencing, Garza notified and then “continuously reminded” his attorney
that he wanted to appeal.87 His attorney, however, refused to file a notice
of appeal and “informed Mr. Garza that an appeal was problematic
because he waived his right to appeal.”88
Garza later claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether “the
presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega applies regardless
of whether the defendant has signed an appeal waiver.”89 The Garza
Court answered this question in the affirmative, finding, inter alia, that
“[m]ost fundamentally, courts agree that defendants retain the right to
challenge whether [an appeal] waiver itself is valid and enforceable—for
example, on the grounds that it was unknowing or involuntary.”90
3. Conclusion
As the Garza Court noted, a defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal
must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.91 Moreover, in certain
83. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 487.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 742; see also id. at 750 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting specific charges
Garza pled to).
87. Id. at 743.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 749.
90. Id. at 745.
91. See id. at 745 n.6 (first citing United States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(“Like all other courts of appeals, our circuit holds that a defendant ‘may waive his right to appeal
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circumstances, defense counsel must consult with his client before he
waives his right to appeal, with a presumption of prejudice attaching to
dereliction of that duty.92
D. The Decision About Whether to Testify
1. Rock v. Arkansas and the Recognition of the Right to Testify
The Supreme Court recognized defendant’s right to testify in Rock v.
Arkansas. In Rock, Vicki Rock was charged with manslaughter in
connection with the shooting death of her husband.93 When Rock could
not remember the precise details of the shooting, her attorney suggested
that she be hypnotized to refresh her recollection.94 A neuropsychologist
with training in hypnosis subsequently hypnotized Rock, who then
“recalled that the gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm
during [a] scuffle.”95 The trial court, however, precluded Rock from
testifying, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas later affirmed, applying a
per se ban on the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony.96
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, first finding that a
criminal defendant has the right to testify based on several constitutional
provisions, including the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause, the Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation, and the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.97 The Court then found Arkansas’s
per se ban on hypnotically refreshed testimony violated these rights.98
2. Waiver of the Right to Testify
Courts across the country have held that a defendant’s waiver of the
right to testify “must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”99 The
Supreme Court, however, “never has held that a trial court must engage
in a personal colloquy with a defendant to determine whether he wishes
to testify or that a waiver of the right to testify must occur formally on
his sentence as long as his decision is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.’”); then citing Spann v.
State, 704 N.W.2d 486, 491 (Minn. 2005) (“Jurisdictions allowing a defendant to waive his or her
right to appeal a conviction require that the waiver be made ‘intelligently, voluntarily, and with an
understanding of the consequences.’”)).
92. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479–80 (2000) (discussing defense counsel’s duty
to consult with client before waiving client’s right to appeal if there is reason to think any rational
defendant would want to appeal or if the specific defendant demonstrated an interest in appealing).
93. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 45 (1987).
94. Id. at 46.
95. Id. at 47.
96. Id. at 48–49.
97. Id. at 51–52.
98. Id. at 56–62.
99. United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 1998).
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the record.”100 Moreover, most federal circuit courts of appeals
“consistently have held that a trial court has no duty to explain to the
defendant that he or she has a right to testify or to verify that the defendant
who is not testifying has waived that right voluntarily.”101 Indeed, a
number of courts have found that there should not be a colloquy because,
inter alia, it “inadvertently might cause the defendant to think that the
court believes the defense has been insufficient.”102 That said, a number
of federal circuit courts have also recognized that “in exceptional,
narrowly defined circumstances, judicial interjection through a direct
colloquy with the defendant may be required to ensure that the
defendant’s right to testify is protected.”103
While judges generally do not need to conduct a colloquy on the right
to testify, courts across the country have concluded that defense counsel
has a duty to discuss the right to testify before the defendant can
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive that right.104 In the
seminal case,105 United States v. Teague, the Eleventh Circuit held that
“if defense counsel never informed the defendant of the right to testify
. . . counsel would have neglected the vital professional responsibility of
ensuring that the defendant’s right to testify is protected and that any
waiver of that right is knowing and voluntary.”106 Therefore, “[u]nder
such circumstances, defense counsel has not acted ‘within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,’ and the defendant
clearly has not received reasonably effective assistance of counsel.”107
Nonetheless, like the Teague court, most courts have held that a
defendant still needs to establish the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel test and that the failure to advise can constitute
harmless error.108
3. Conclusion
A defendant’s waiver of the right to testify must be knowing,

100. Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir. 2008).
101. United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 11 (3d Cir. 1995).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Kenneth Duvall, The Defendant Was Not Heard . . . Now What?: Prejudice Analysis,
Harmless Error Review, and the Right to Testify, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 279, 282–84 (2012).
105. Id. at 283.
106. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992).
107. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
108. See Duvall, supra note 104, at 295–303 (exploring how, in determining whether his or her
constitutional rights were violated, defendant bears a higher burden of proof to prove prejudice
(reasonable probability) versus error (reasonable doubt), which may or may not be found to be
harmless).
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voluntary, and intelligent.109 Courts have found that attorneys render
deficient performance by failing to discuss with their clients whether this
right should be waived, but courts have found that defendants need to
establish the prejudice that flows from this failure to consult.110
III. RIGHT TO AUTONOMY
In opinions separated by fourteen years, the Supreme Court dealt with
two cases that both involved an attorney who admitted his client’s guilt
without obtaining his client’s express consent. But there was a key
difference between the cases that led the Court to recognize a right to
autonomy in the latter, creating a fifth decision reserved for the defendant
rather than defense counsel.
A. Florida v. Nixon and Silent Acquiescence
In Florida v. Nixon, Joe Nixon was charged with first-degree murder
and related charges in connection with the death of Jeannie Bickner.111
His public defender, Michael Corin, sought a plea deal, but “the
prosecutors indicated their unwillingness to recommend a sentence other
than death.”112 Faced with overwhelming evidence implicating his client,
“Corin concluded that the best strategy would be to concede guilt, thereby
preserving his credibility in urging leniency during the penalty phase.”113
Corin tried to explain this trial strategy to Nixon at least three times, but
“Nixon was generally unresponsive during their discussions” and “never
verbally approved or protested Corin’s proposed strategy.”114 Corin thus
forged ahead with his strategy, telling jurors during his opening
statement:
In this case, there won’t be any question, none whatsoever, that my
client, Joe Elton Nixon, caused Jeannie Bickner’s death. . . . [T]hat fact
will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any doubt. This case is about
the death of Joe Elton Nixon and whether it should occur within the
next few years by electrocution or maybe its natural expiration after a
lifetime of confinement.115

109. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing the recognized
standard for a waiver of the right to testify requiring the waiver be knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent).
110. See Duvall, supra notes 104–105, 108 and accompanying text (illustrating requirements
imposed on counsel when waiving their clients’ right to testify); see also Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534
(providing that defendant must show defense counsel made serious errors and deficient
performance prejudiced the defense thus depriving defendant of a fair trial).
111. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 179–80 (2004).
112. Id. at 181.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 182–83 (quoting from the trial court record).
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After he was convicted and sentenced to death, Nixon appealed,
claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel.116 The Supreme
Court of Florida agreed, finding that counsel’s comments were the
“functional equivalent of a guilty plea.”117 As such, Nixon’s “silent
acquiescence” to Corin’s trial strategy was not enough; instead, Nixon
needed to give “affirmative, explicit acceptance” to counsel’s
strategy.”118
The United States Supreme Court later granted certiorari to determine,
inter alia, “whether counsel’s failure to obtain the defendant’s express
consent to a strategy of conceding guilt in a capital trial automatically
renders counsel’s performance deficient . . . .”119 The Court began by
noting that “[a]n attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the
client regarding ‘important decisions,’ including questions of
overarching defense strategy.”120 But the Court then cited Taylor v.
Illinois for the proposition that this duty “does not require counsel to
obtain the defendant’s consent to ‘every tactical decision.’”121
The Court again recognized the defendant “has ‘the ultimate authority’
to determine ‘whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her
own behalf, or take an appeal.’”122 And, according to the Court, for each
of these four decisions, “an attorney must both consult with the defendant
and obtain consent to the recommended course of action.”123
The Court, however, rejected the Supreme Court of Florida’s
conclusion that Corin’s comments were the functional equivalent of a
guilty plea.124 Rather, the Court distinguished this case from Brookhart
v. Janis, where defense counsel had “agreed to a ‘prima facie’ bench trial
at which the State would be relieved of its obligation to put on ‘complete
proof’ of guilt or persuade a jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.”125 Conversely, “there was in Nixon’s case no
‘truncated’ proceeding shorn of the need to persuade the trier ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt,’ and of the defendant’s right to confront and crossexamine witnesses.”126
This distinction allowed the Court in this case to draw a dichotomy.
116. Id. at 185.
117. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618, 625 (2000)).
118. Id. at 185–86 (quoting Nixon, 758 So.2d at 624)
119. Id. at 186.
120. Id. at 187 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
121. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988)).
122. Id. (first quoting Jones v. Barnes, 751 (1983); then quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 188.
125. Id. (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966)).
126. Id. at 188–89 (quoting Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 6).
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On the one hand, “Corin was obliged to, and in fact several times did,
explain his proposed trial strategy to Nixon.”127 On the other hand,
“[g]iven Nixon’s constant resistance to answering inquiries put to him by
counsel and court, Corin was not additionally required to gain express
consent before conceding Nixon’s guilt.”128 Put another way, “[w]hen
counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in
the defendant’s best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel’s
strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the
defendant’s explicit consent.”129 Instead, a court must determine on a
case-by-case basis whether counsel’s choice constituted ineffective
assistance.130 Specifically, “if counsel’s strategy, given the evidence
bearing on the defendant’s guilt, satisfies the Strickland standard, that is
the end of the matter; no tenable claim of ineffective assistance would
remain.”131
B. McCoy v. Louisiana and the Right to Autonomy
Fourteen years later, in McCoy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court dealt
with the question of what happens when a defendant does not silently
acquiesce in his counsel’s decision to admit guilt but instead loudly
objects. In McCoy, Robert McCoy was charged with three counts of firstdegree murder.132 McCoy’s parents hired attorney Larry English who
“concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and that,
absent a concession at the guilt stage that McCoy was the killer, a death
sentence would be impossible to avoid at the penalty phase.”133 McCoy
was “furious” with this decision and told English “not to make that
concession,” maintaining that “he was out of State at the time of the
killings.”134 McCoy subsequently moved to terminate English’s
representation of him, but the trial judge denied the motion, telling
English, “[Y]ou are the attorney,” and “you have to make the trial
decision of what you’re going to proceed with.”135 Thereafter, in his
opening statement, English told the jurors that the evidence was
“unambiguous” that “my client committed three murders.”136
127. Id. at 189.
128. Id. (internal citations omitted).
129. Id. at 192.
130. See id. (noting that the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, asking if counsel’s
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” controls in a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel (466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984))).
131. Id.
132. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1506 (2018).
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting the trial court record).
135. Id. (quoting the trial court record).
136. Id. at 1507 (quoting the trial court record).
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After he was convicted and given three death sentences, McCoy
appealed, with that appeal eventually reaching the United States Supreme
Court.137 The Court began by observing that “[t]rial management is the
lawyer’s province,” but that “[s]ome decisions . . . are reserved for the
client—notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial,
testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal.”138 The Court then
recognized a right to autonomy, concluding that “[a]utonomy to decide
that the objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs in this
latter category.”139 According to the Court, just as a defendant may refuse
to plead guilty or choose to proceed pro se, “so may she insist on
maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial.”140 The
Court reached this conclusion by finding that “[t]hese are not strategic
choices about how best to achieve a client’s objectives; they are choices
about what the client’s objectives in fact are.”141
Specifically, while defense counsel might conclude that conceding
guilt and begging for forgiveness is the superior trial objective, “the client
may not share that objective.”142 Instead, the client “may wish to avoid,
above all else, the opprobrium that comes with admitting he killed family
members. Or he may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk
death for any hope, however small, of exoneration.”143
The Court then cautioned that “[p]reserving for the defendant the
ability to decide whether to maintain his innocence should not displace
counsel’s, or the court’s, respective trial management roles.”144 And the
Court acknowledged that “[c]ounsel, in any case, must still develop a trial
strategy and discuss it with her client, explaining why, in her view,
conceding guilt would be the best option.”145 The key question
distinguishing Florida v. Nixon and McCoy is what happens after that
discussion.146
The Court found Nixon factually distinguishable because, unlike
English, “Nixon’s attorney did not negate Nixon’s autonomy by
overriding Nixon’s desired defense objective, for Nixon never asserted
any such objective.”147 Instead, “Nixon ‘was generally unresponsive’
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1508 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1509.
145. Id. (internal citations omitted).
146. See id. (comparing Nixon’s and McCoy’s respective approaches to carrying out defendant’s
objectives when defendant remains silent versus when defendant rejects counsel’s advice).
147. Id.
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during discussions of trial strategy, and ‘never verbally approved or
protested’ counsel’s proposed approach.”148 The McCoy Court thus
concluded Nixon stands for the proposition that “[i]f a client declines to
participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the
defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best
interest.”149
Conversely, if an attorney tells his client that he is going to concede
guilt, the client objects, and the attorney proceeds with this strategy, it is
not just error, but structural error.150 According to the Court, “[v]iolation
of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy ranks as error of
the kind our decisions have called ‘structural’; when present, such an
error is not subject to harmless-error review.”151 The McCoy Court could
reach this conclusion because attorney override implicates at least two of
the rationales necessitating a finding of structural error:
(1) “if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from
erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,” such as
“the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to
make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty;”
and
(2) “when its effects are too hard to measure, as is true of the right to
counsel of choice.”152
With regard to the first rationale, “[s]uch an admission blocks the
defendant’s right to make the fundamental choices about his own
defense.”153 Furthermore, under the second rationale, “the effects of the
admission would be immeasurable, because a jury would almost certainly
be swayed by a lawyer’s concession of his client’s guilt.”154
IV. THE REAL MCCOY
McCoy clearly stands for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to
a new trial when, over his objection, his attorney admits he is legally
guilty of the crime(s) charged. But it arguably left open two questions:
(1) What happens when an attorney admits his client’s legal guilt without
running the decision by his client; and (2) What happens when an attorney
admits that his client committed one or more but not all of the elements
of the crime(s) charged?

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 181 (2004)).
Id.
Id. at 1511.
Id.
Id. (quoting Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017)).
Id.
Id.
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A. Attorneys Not Consulting with Their Clients About the Decision to
Admit Guilt
1. Post-McCoy Precedent
In the wake of McCoy, seemingly all courts have found Florida v.
Nixon applies and the right to autonomy does not apply when an attorney
fails to consult with his client before admitting his legal guilt. For
example, in Atwater v. State, Jeffrey Atwater was charged with firstdegree murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder
in connection with the death of Kenneth Smith.155 During closing
arguments, Atwater’s attorney stated, “We’re not hiding anything from
you. We’re asking you to do your duty, to render the only verdict that is
fair and just, and that is as to Count One of the indictment, that Jeffrey
Atwater is guilty of Murder in the Second Degree.”156
After being convicted of first-degree murder and receiving a death
sentence, Atwater appealed, claiming that his right to autonomy under
McCoy was violated because his attorney did not “discuss with [him] the
potential trial strategy of conceding guilt.”157 The Supreme Court of
Florida disagreed, finding that Atwater’s claim that his attorney failed to
discuss trial strategy with him was covered by Florida v. Nixon.158 The
court concluded, “[a]t its heart, Atwater’s claim is not a McCoy claim;
Atwater has not alleged that counsel conceded guilt over Atwater’s
objection.”159 As a result, the state supreme court held that “the trial court
was right to conclude that Atwater’s allegations are facially insufficient
to warrant relief under McCoy.”160
Similarly, in Pennebaker v. Rewerts, Danny R. Pennebaker was
convicted of felonious assault and assault with intent to rob while
armed.161 After he was convicted, Pennebaker appealed, claiming, inter
alia, that his attorney improperly admitted his guilt at trial without first
consulting with him.162 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan disagreed, concluding that:
Even if, as Petitioner alleges, his attorney never discussed trial strategy
with him, he was on notice of counsel’s defense theory as soon as
counsel made his opening statement. Yet Petitioner failed to oppose this
155. Atwater v. State, 300 So.3d 589, 589 (Fla. 2020).
156. Initial Brief of the Appellant at 22, Atwater v. State, 300 So.3d 589 (Fla. 2020) (No. SC191709), 2019 WL 6273372, at *22.
157. Atwater, 300 So.3d at 591.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Pennebaker v. Rewerts, No. 17-12196, 2020 WL 4284060, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 27,
2020).
162. Id.
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strategy with his attorney or before the court; nor did he clearly and
consistently insist on a defense of innocence. Instead, Petitioner, like
the defendant in Nixon, only objected to counsel’s defense strategy after
trial. As a result, this is not a case of structural error, as in McCoy, but
rather, invokes Nixon’s analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel.163

Similarly, in People v. Santana, Juan Carlos Santana was convicted of
burglary, receiving stolen property, and second-degree murder.164 At
trial, “[i]n closing argument, [defense counsel] conceded Santana’s guilt
for burglary, receiving stolen property, and second-degree murder, and
even argued the evidence showed Santana was guilty.”165 After he was
convicted, Santana appealed, claiming that defense counsel violated his
right to autonomy by failing to consult with him about his decision to
admit legal guilt.166 The court disagreed, finding that “[t]he record in this
case is silent as to Santana’s objectives, so it falls closer to Nixon [than
McCoy] and compels us to reject his claim.”167 In other words, McCoy
was inapplicable even though defense counsel “did not tell Santana of his
planned concession strategy . . . .”168
2. Conclusion: The Right to Autonomy Recognized in McCoy Should
Cover Admissions Made Without Client Consultation
These courts are incorrectly concluding that attorney admissions made
without client consultation are not covered by the McCoy v. Louisiana
right-to-autonomy framework. In McCoy, the Court placed the right to
autonomy in the category of decisions reserved for the defendant, along
with decisions about whether to (1) plead guilty; (2) waive the right to a
jury trial; (3) testify in one’s own behalf; and (4) forgo an appeal.169 As
explained in Section II, to be constitutionally valid, each of these
decisions must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, but the Supreme
Court and lower courts have established different mechanisms for
determining whether this standard has been satisfied.
For a defendant’s decision to plead guilty to be constitutional, there
must be an affirmative showing on the record that the judge accepted the
plea only after determining defendant’s decision to waive several trial
rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.170 With regard to a
163. Id. at *4.
164. People v. Santana, No. B286320, 2019 WL 3425294, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2019).
165. Id. at *7.
166. Id. at *6.
167. Id. at *9.
168. Id.
169. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018).
170. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text (discussing Boykin v. Alabama and the
Supreme Court’s holding that for trial court’s acceptance of defendant’s guilty plea to be
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defendant’s decision to waive a jury trial in favor of a bench trial, Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) sets forth a procedure for waiver, and
many courts also require a colloquy, but neither of these are constitutional
requirements.171 Meanwhile, in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defense counsel renders deficient performance by failing to advise a
defendant of his right to trial by jury, but courts are split over whether
such failures are structural error or whether the defendant must establish
prejudice.172
For a defendant’s decision not to appeal, under the ineffectiveassistance test, in limited circumstances, defense counsel has a duty to
consult with his client before the client makes that decision, and the
failure to consult under those circumstances is per se prejudicial.173
Finally, with regard to a defendant’s decision not to testify, defense
counsel has a duty to consult with his client before the client makes that
decision, but the defendant must establish that the failure to consult was
prejudicial.174
Although the Court in Florida v. Nixon did not cite Roe v. FloresOrtega, its opinion in the latter case fully explains its opinion in the
former case. As noted in Section II.C.1, the Supreme Court held in
Flores-Ortega there is “a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with
the defendant about an appeal” only “when there is reason to think either
(1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because
there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular
defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in
appealing.”175 And, as noted, one of the rationales the Court gave for this
limited duty to consult is there can be cases in which (1) defense counsel
“informs the defendant of his appeal rights;” (2) “the defendant does not
express any interest in appealing;” and (3) “counsel concludes that there
are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal.”176
This is essentially the same analysis the Supreme Court applied in
Florida v. Nixon, but in connection with the right to claim innocence
constitutional, court must affirmatively show waiver of jury trial and other constitutional rights was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).
171. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23(a) and the evolution of procedure for valid waiver of jury trial right ).
172. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing situations where the court has
found defense counsel rendered deficient performance).
173. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (discussing Roe v. Flores-Ortega’s holding
regarding when counsel must consult with their client about an appeal and what constitutes deficient
performance).
174. See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text (discussing counsel’s obligation to
inform a defendant of their right to testify, and in situations where this doesn't occur, defendants
need to prove failure to consult caused prejudice to prove ineffective counsel).
175. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000).
176. Id. at 479.
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rather than the right to appeal. Specifically, in Nixon, (1) defense counsel
informed the defendant that he planned to admit guilt at trial; (2) the
defendant did not express any interest in maintaining his innocence; and
(3) counsel concluded that admitting guilt was the best way to preserve
“his credibility in urging leniency during the penalty phase.”177
This is entirely consistent with the McCoy Court’s characterization of
Florida v. Nixon. As noted, the McCoy Court concluded Nixon stands for
the proposition that “[i]f a client declines to participate in his defense,
then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant to the
strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best interest.”178 Breaking
this down, as with the other four decisions reserved for the client, the
defendant must knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive the right
to autonomy, i.e., the right to maintain innocence. When defense counsel
informs the defendant that he plans to concede his guilt at trial and the
defendant is unresponsive, the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waives this right and allows defense counsel to decide
whether to concede guilt, with defense counsel’s decision subject to a
traditional ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis.
Conversely, when defense counsel does not inform the defendant that
he plans to concede guilt, the defendant does not—cannot—knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to autonomy. This is where
the right to autonomy differs from the right to appeal. As the Court held
in Flores-Ortega, there can be situations in which a defendant is aware
of his right to appeal from statements made by the judge and/or his
attorney and therefore is deemed to have knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived that right based on failure to affirmatively exercise
it.
On the other hand, if defense counsel never tells his client that he plans
to admit his guilt, there is no way for the defendant to have knowledge of
that decision. In a case like McCoy, there is a violation of the right to
autonomy because the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently asserted his right to maintain his innocence after his attorney
told him that he planned to admit his guilt. But in a case like Atwater,
there should be a similar violation of the right to autonomy because the
defendant was never given a chance to knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently assert his right. Unlike in Nixon, such a defendant does not
decline to participate in his defense but instead is never afforded the
opportunity to participate. Therefore, the McCoy right to autonomy
should apply when defense counsel never informs the defendant of his
plan to concede guilt.
177. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 181–83 (2004).
178. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1509 (2018).
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B. Attorneys Admitting Some, But Not All, of the Elements of a Crime
1. Courts Concluding That the Right to Autonomy Doesn’t Cover
Partial Admissions
In the wake of McCoy, several courts have held that the right to
autonomy does not entitle a defendant to prevent his attorney from
admitting that the defendant committed some, but not all, of the elements
of a crime. For example, in United States v. Rosemond, James Rosemond,
the owner of Czar Records, was “engaged in a contentious, often-violent
rivalry” with neighboring Violator Records and one of its acts, G-Unit.179
In March 2007, Lowell Fletcher and another G-Unit associate pushed,
slapped, and threatened Rosemond’s fourteen-year-old son, who was
wearing a “Czar” sweatshirt.180 Subsequently, Brian McCleod, who had
met Rosemond in jail in the late 1990s, told Rosemond that “he had ‘a
line on the guy that slapped your son.’”181 Thereafter,
Rosemond and McCleod met up again around a week-and-a-half later.
They talked more about “the line” McCleod had on Fletcher, and
Rosemond said: “I have $30,000 for anybody who brings him to me
cause I’mma hit him so hard and so fast he’s not gonna see it coming.”
After Rosemond said he was considering “doing this” himself, he asked
for McCleod’s thoughts. McCleod believed it was unwise for
Rosemond to be involved in any violence himself, so he mentioned
involving [Derrick] Grant. Rosemond instructed McCleod to see
whether Grant would be interested. Grant was, but he wanted more than
$30,000. McCleod agreed with Grant that a larger fee was required
because the $30,000 was McCleod’s fee for luring Fletcher to an attack,
and Grant would need “at least twice that amount, if not more, maybe
even close to a hundred [thousand dollars]” to be the shooter. McCleod
then informed Rosemond that Grant was now involved in the plan.182

After Grant later killed Fletcher with McCleod’s assistance, Rosemond
“was charged with murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-forhire, possession of a firearm during a murder-for-hire conspiracy, and
murder through use of a firearm.”183 At the end of trial, “[i]n his closing
argument, Rosemond’s attorney, David Touger, acknowledged that
Rosemond paid for Fletcher to be shot, but he argued that the government
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rosemond intended for
Fletcher to be killed.”184 This argument was over the objection of
Rosemond, who “maintained that he hired these associates only to bring
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

United States v. Rosemond, 958 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id. at 116.
Id. at 117 (quoting trial court record).
Id. (internal citations to trial court record omitted).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 119.
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Fletcher to him, and that he never intended for Fletcher to be shot or
killed.”185 Rosemond thus argued his counsel violated his right to
autonomy under McCoy.186
The Second Circuit disagreed, concluding “the right to autonomy is
not implicated when defense counsel concedes one element of the
charged crime while maintaining that the defendant is not guilty as
charged.”187 The court advanced two arguments in support of this
conclusion. First, the Second Circuit noted that “[t]hroughout its opinion,
the McCoy Court’s use of the word ‘guilt’ [was] explicitly limited to the
charged crime.”188
Second, the court observed that the McCoy “majority repeatedly made
clear that its decision was meant to safeguard the ‘objective of [one’s]
defense,’” with one such objective being an acquittal.189 But then, “[o]nce
a defendant decides on an objective—e.g., acquittal—‘[t]rial
management is the lawyer’s province’ and counsel must decide, inter alia,
‘what arguments to pursue.’”190 Therefore, the Second Circuit found that
Rosemond’s right to autonomy was not violated because “[c]onceding an
element of a crime while contesting the other elements falls within the
ambit of trial strategy.”191 As support for this holding, the Second Circuit
cited similar opinions of the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.192
Some state courts have reached similar conclusions. For instance, in
Matter of Somerville, Dennis Somerville was charged with first-degree
rape after DNA evidence collected from the victim implicated him in the
crime.193 In his opening statement, Somerville’s attorney told the jurors
that “essentially, we are not going to have a lot to say. . . . [F]rankly, we
don’t have argument with the State’s science here or the handling of their
evidence . . . . I’m not anticipating defense evidence about the science.”194
Defense counsel went on to explain “to the jury that their focus during
185. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, United States v. Rosemond, 958 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2020)
(No. 18-3561-CR), 2019 WL 1991995, at *1.
186. See Rosemond, 958 F.3d at 119 (discussing the Sixth Amendment as it “provides certain
procedural safeguards” to criminal defendants); see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
379 (1979) (discussing the Sixth Amendment).
187. Rosemond, 958 F.3d at 122.
188. Id. (quoting McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 (2018)).
189. Id. (quoting McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1505, 1508–10, 1512).
190. Id. (quoting McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 123 (citing United States v. Holloway, 939 F.3d 1088, 1101 n.8 (10th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Audette, 923 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 2019); Thompson v. United States, 791 F.
App’x 20, 26–27 (11th Cir. 2019)) (discussing sister circuits’ decisions interpreting McCoy and
holding that McCoy is limited to a defendant’s right to maintain his innocence of the charged
crimes).
193. In re Somerville, No. 53586-6-II, 2020 WL 6281524, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2020).
194. Id. (quoting respondent opening brief).
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the trial should be on whether there was reasonable doubt that a threat
was made to [the victim], and if there was any evidence of a gun.”195
After he was convicted, Somerville appealed, claiming, inter alia, that
his attorney “effectively conceded . . . the actus reus of the charged
offense.”196 The Court of Appeals of Washington disagreed, concluding
that, “even if this was true, a crime also requires a mens rea element;”
therefore, “defense counsel’s conduct at trial did not indicate a
concession of guilt rising to the level recognized in McCoy.”197 Similarly,
in State v. Crump, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina found that
defense counsel’s comments during closing arguments admitting
defendant committed the actus reus of second-degree forcible sexual
offense did not trigger McCoy because those comments “were at most an
admission of an element of the offense without Defendant’s consent.” 198
2. The Right to Autonomy Recognized in McCoy Should Cover
Admissions That Might Lead to Opprobrium
a. McCoy and Actus Reus Admissions
The Second Circuit in Rosemond and other courts reaching similar
results are fundamentally misreading McCoy by holding that the question
of whether to admit an element of a crime is a matter of trial strategy.
Rather, the McCoy majority clearly concluded that a client’s objective
can be—and indeed McCoy’s overriding objective was—to avoid the
opprobrium that comes with admitting a heinous act. This is the
inexorable conclusion that must be drawn from McCoy, tracking Justice
Ginsberg’s majority opinion.
In McCoy’s merits brief to the Supreme Court, he advanced two
reasons why the decision to admit guilt at trial must lie with the
defendant. First, “[i]t is the defendant who will lose his liberty or face the
executioner.”199 Second, “[i]t is the defendant who will face the
opprobrium of admitting guilt to a capital offense, reserved for the
‘narrow category of the most serious crimes.’”200
At oral arguments, Justice Kagan seemed to pick up on this argument,
asking Elizabeth Murrill, Solicitor General of Louisiana, the following
question:

195. Id.
196. Id. at *4 (quoting respondent reply brief).
197. Id.
198. State v. Crump, 848 S.E.2d 501, 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020).
199. Brief for Petitioner at 26, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (No. 16-8255), 2017
WL 5495452, at *26.
200. Id. at 26–27 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008)).
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Well, for sure we’ve given lawyers a lot of leeway to make quite a
number of decisions when they’re representing a defendant, troubled
and untroubled, and the idea is that lawyers know better, sometimes,
than their clients and that we should want to lodge a great many strategic
decisions in their hands rather than in the client’s.
But you’re not talking about here, or we’re not talking about here,
about how to pursue a set of objectives. Is it better to pursue it this way
or is it better to pursue it that way?
We’re talking about a client saying: You have to follow—I have—I
have an overriding objective in this case, and that’s to avoid the
opprobrium that comes with admitting that I killed family members. And
that’s my overriding objective.
And you’re saying that the lawyer can say it doesn’t matter that that’s
your overriding objective. And I guess what I want to know is why.201

Murrill then responded,
Well, because—first, Your Honor, I—I don’t think that that’s entirely
how Mr. McCoy characterized his objective. I—I would describe it
more as though he said I know a better way to cross this divide and
we’re going to cross it by letting me drive the—this car over the cliff
because the car will fly.202

Justice Ginsberg, however, clearly disagreed with this characterization of
McCoy’s overriding objection by responding to Murrill, “But he didn’t
say that. He said, and I think this much is clear from the record, he said
in no uncertain terms: I do not want to concede that I killed these three
people.”203
After Murrill responded, “Yes, Justice Ginsburg,” the Justice made
clear that McCoy’s decision not to admit he killed the victims was a trial
objective rather than trial strategy. Specifically, in her response to
Murrill, Justice Ginsberg stated, “He wasn’t talking about strategy at that
time. He just said I do not want to concede that I killed these people.” 204
A straight line can be drawn from McCoy’s merits brief, to this portion
of oral arguments, to Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion. In finding
McCoy’s attorney violated McCoy’s right to autonomy by overriding his
objective, Justice Ginsberg ruled:
Counsel may reasonably assess a concession of guilt as best suited to
avoiding the death penalty, as English did here. But the client may not
share that objective. He may wish to avoid, above all else, the
opprobrium that comes with admitting he killed family members, or he

201. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (No.
16-8255), 2018 WL 1368611, at *37–38 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 38.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id.
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may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk death for any
hope, however small, of exoneration.205

b. Courts Applying McCoy’s Opprobrium Language to Cover
Partial Admissions
In People v. Flores, Roberto Flores was prosecuted in separate trials
on weapons charges and an attempted murder charge based on striking a
police officer with his car.206 At both trials, Flores’s objective “was
express and unambiguous: to maintain his innocence of the acts alleged
as the actus reus of the charged crimes—i.e. driving the car and
possessing the weapons—irrespective of the weight of the evidence
against him.”207 His attorney, however, “in pursuit of the understandable
objective of achieving an acquittal, . . . conceded the actus reus of the
charged crimes at both trials.”208 Flores, however, was convicted at both
trials.209
In addressing Flores’s ensuing appeal, the Court of Appeals of
California acknowledged “[i]t was not unreasonable for counsel to
conclude that conceding the actus reus offered Flores the best chance to
achieve an acquittal at either trial.”210 The court, however, rejected the
State’s presumption “that Flores’s objective was an acquittal, not
maintaining innocence of the alleged acts.”211 Instead, the court
concluded that this presumption “disregard[ed] McCoy’s discussion of
plausible objectives that a defendant might have at trial, among others the
avoidance of the ‘opprobrium that comes with admitting [one] killed
family members.’”212
Similarly, in United States v. Read, Jonathan Read was charged with
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm and assault
with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury.213 At trial, over
Read’s objection, his attorney unsuccessfully presented an insanity
defense.214 In granting Read a new trial on appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that “McCoy’s emphasis on the defendant’s autonomy strongly suggests
that counsel cannot impose an insanity defense on a non-consenting
205. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1503–04 (2018).
206. People v. Flores, 246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
207. Id. at 84–85.
208. Id. at 79.
209. Id. at 81.
210. Id. at 85–86.
211. Id. at 86.
212. Id. (quoting McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508–09 (2018)).
213. United States v. Read, 918 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2019).
214. See id. at 717 (noting that Read’s appointed counsel, whom the court insisted on
reappointing after Read had attempted to proceed pro se after objecting to counsel’s planned
insanity defense, nevertheless maintained the insanity defense over Read’s objections).
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defendant.”215
In reaching this result, the Ninth Circuit held that “[a]n insanity
defense is tantamount to a concession of guilt. Moreover, a defense of
insanity, like a concession of guilt, carries grave personal consequences
that go beyond the sphere of trial tactics.”216 Specifically, “[a] defendant
may not wish to plead insane because of a firmly held ‘feeling that he was
not mentally ill at the time of the crime.’”217 According to the court,
“[j]ust as conceding guilt might carry ‘opprobrium’ that a defendant
might ‘wish to avoid, above all else,’. . . ‘a defendant, with good reason,
may choose to avoid the stigma of insanity.’”218
C. Conclusion: The Right to Autonomy Recognized in McCoy Should
Cover Admissions That Might Lead to Opprobrium
Justice Ginsberg’s McCoy majority opinion, especially when read in
conjunction with oral arguments and McCoy’s merits brief, makes clear
that a defendant’s trial objective can include avoiding opprobrium. In his
merits brief, McCoy argued the decision to admit guilt must lie with the
defendant because (1) “[i]t is the defendant who will lose his liberty or
face the executioner;” and (2) “it is the defendant who will face the
opprobrium of admitting guilt.”219 Thereafter, at oral arguments, (1)
Justice Kagan stated that McCoy’s “overriding objective in this case
. . .[was] to avoid the opprobrium that comes with admitting that [he]
killed family members;” and (2) Justice Ginsberg concluded that
McCoy’s objective, and not merely his strategy, was to avoid conceding
he killed the three victims.220 Finally, Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion
recognized the right to autonomy in McCoy because, inter alia, a
defendant might want to avoid the opprobrium accompanying admissions
or preserve the possibility of an exoneration.221 From this, it is clear that:
(1) McCoy’s objective was to avoid the opprobrium accompanying the
admission that he killed his family members; (2) avoiding opprobrium is
a trial objective and not merely a trial strategy; and (3) although they can
overlap, avoiding opprobrium and avoiding conviction are distinct trial
objectives.
This logic is consistent with the law surrounding pleading. As noted
215. Id. at 720.
216. Id. (internal citations omitted).
217. Id. (quoting McLaren v. State, 407 P.3d 1200, 1213 (Wyo. 2017)).
218. Id. (first quoting McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018); then quoting Frendak
v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 377 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979)).
219. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 199, at 26–27 (explaining why defendant should decide
their plea).
220. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 201, at 37–38 (emphasis added) (reiterating
reasons and motives behind why McCoy would want to maintain his innocence).
221. See id. at 38 (explaining why a defendant may not want to admit guilt).
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previously, it is the client, not counsel, who decides what plea to enter.222
But the decision over what plea to enter is not a binary choice between
“guilty” and “not guilty” pleas. In federal court, a defendant can proffer
a nolo contendere plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(a)(3).223 Similarly, in state courts, defendants can proffer nolo
contendere pleas224 or no contest pleas,225 depending on the jurisdiction.
Nolo contendere and no contest pleas are the same: “When a defendant
pleads nolo contendere or no contest, he does not admit his guilt; instead,
the plea is merely an indication that he will not contest the charges
brought against him.”226 While functionally a guilty plea, a nolo
contendere or no contest plea is inadmissible against a defendant in a
subsequent proceeding, unlike a traditional guilty plea.227
Defendants can also proffer Alford pleas pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s opinion in North Carolina v. Alford.228 In Alford, the Supreme
Court held that a court can accept a guilty plea in which the defendant
affirmatively maintains his innocence but acknowledges the State has
sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.229 There
is currently a split among courts over whether Alford pleas are admissible
against defendants in subsequent proceedings.230
There are practical reasons why a defendant might choose to enter one
of these pleas given that (1) nolo contendere and no contest pleas are
inadmissible; and (2) Alford pleas may be inadmissible. If, for instance,
a defendant is charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection with
a fatal car accident, use of one of these pleas, rather than a standard guilty
plea, would render the plea inadmissible at a subsequent civil wrongfuldeath lawsuit involving the same accident.
There are, however, practical reasons why an attorney would prefer his
222. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1966) (emphasizing that counsel cannot override
their client’s express desire to plead a certain way).
223. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(3).
224. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.170(b) (allowing nolo contendere pleas in Florida).
225. See, e.g., OHIO R. CRIM. P. 11(B) (allowing no contest pleas in Ohio).
226. Colin Miller, The Best Offense Is a Good Defense: Why Criminal Defendants’ Nolo
Contendere Pleas Should Be Inadmissible Against Them When They Become Civil Plaintiffs, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 725, 725 (2006).
227. FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(2).
228. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (explaining that a defendant may
“voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence”
although he denies guilt).
229. See id. at 38–39 (explaining the basis for Alford’s plea, and its validity).
230. Compare United States v. In, No. 2:09CR00070, 2010 WL 2869108, at *2 (D. Utah July
20, 2010) (“Defendant has provided no binding or persuasive authority that Defendant’s Alford
plea should be treated as anything other than a standard guilty plea for purposes of Rule 410.”),
with United States v. Elizondo, 277 F. Supp. 2d 691, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding defendant’s
Alford plea akin to a plea of nolo contendere and precluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence from
admission in subsequent proceedings).
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client to enter a standard guilty plea. Namely, a judge is likely to impose
a more lenient sentence when a defendant pleads guilty and accepts
responsibility for his actions, and impose a harsher sentence when a
defendant simply does not contest the charges against him or
affirmatively maintains his innocence. Indeed, a defendant is entitled to
a two-level downward adjustment of his offense level under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.”231
Professor Stephanos Bibas (now a federal judge) interviewed thirtyfour veteran prosecutors, judges, and public and private defense lawyers
to determine why defendants enter nolo contendere or Alford pleas even
“when it would be in their interests” to enter a standard guilty plea.232 In
these interviews, “[t]he most common barrier to a classic guilty plea is
the defendant’s fear of embarrassment and shame before family and
friends.”233 Second, “[a]fter shame, the reason cited most frequently for
defendants’ refusal to admit guilt is psychological denial, in which
defendants refuse to admit guilt to themselves.”234
In other words, in the pleading context, defendants often choose to
enter Alford or nolo contendere/no contest pleas to avoid the moral
opprobrium associated with admitting guilt. Put another way, a
defendant’s primary pleading objective might be to avoid such
opprobrium in the same way that a defendant’s primary trial objective
might be to avoid such opprobrium. It would thus be odd that a pleading
defendant would have the right to effectuate that objective while a trial
defendant would not.
But it’s not just odd that courts would treat such defendants
disparately; it’s inconceivable. Courts allowing attorneys to make partial
admissions without client consent are preventing defendants from having
any ability to maintain their innocence. According to these courts, these
defendants must admit legal guilt through guilty/Alford/nolo contendere
pleas or proceed to trials where their attorneys can admit they committed
opprobrious acts. Therefore, the McCoy right to autonomy should allow
defendants to prevent their attorneys from making partial admissions.
V. CONCLUSION
McCoy clearly stands for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to
a new trial when, over his objection, his attorney admits that he is legally
231. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2020).
232. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1377
(2003).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1378.
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guilty of the crime(s) charged. But it arguably left open two questions:
(1) What happens when an attorney admits his client’s legal guilt without
running the decision by his client, and (2) What happens when an attorney
admits that his client committed one or more but not all of the elements
of the crime(s) charged? This essay has argued that there is a violation of
the right to autonomy when: (1) an attorney admits his client’s legal guilt
without running the decision by his client, and (2) an attorney makes a
partial admission.

